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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
The regulatory environment of the electric utility industry has
changed considerably in the past twenty years. The environment is no
longer fully protected, regulated, and monopolistic. Deregulation ini-
tiatives, national energy policies, and U.S. Supreme Court rulings have
completely changed regulatory conditions. The existing electric utility
industry is less regulated and more competitive than at any time since
the implementation of the Federal Power Act of 1935.
Concurrent with recent changes in the electric utility industry
were changes in Department of Defense procurement methods and
policies. Congress has directed numerous changes in procurement
policies and methods. The general direction of these changes has
been to streamline, standardize, and promote competition in all pro-
curement activities. Public Law 80-413, the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act of 1947 (ASPA), established congressional policies for
the Department of Defense (DoD) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). The Office of Federal Procurement Policies
Act of 1974 (OFPPA) directed all Executive agencies to standardize
procurement methods and regulations. As a result of OFPPA the Sys-
tem of Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) was established. Three
agencies coordinate FAR actions: the Department of Defense, the
General Services Administration, and the National Aeronautics and
8
Space Administration. The methods and practices originally issued as
the FAR were substantially the same as those contained in the regula-
tions they replaced for DoD and NASA— the Defense Acquisition Regu-
lations (DAR). The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) is the first
major procurement act since the ASPA. As such, it has had a substan-
tial effect on all federal government procurement.
B. OBJECTIVES
This study was undertaken to review how the Department of
Defense is applying current statutes and regulations dealing with com-
petitive procurement of electric power. The impetus behind this
research is to gain an understanding of the impact the new federal
procurement policies and procedures have had in electrical power
procurement. Have the new procurement policies overlooked societal
concerns? Is the Department of Defense taking full advantage of
recent laws and court rulings which modify the electric utility indus-
try's regulatory environment? This paper will not provide a fully
detailed analysis of any one public law or procurement regulation.
Rather, it is intended to provide a conceptual base for discussion, and
possible competitive strategies for use within the Department of
Defense.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There are two questions this study will attempt to answer. The
primary one is: What do current federal statutes, regulations, and
policies mandate for competitive procurement of electric power? The
secondary question is: What are the conditions necessary for the
Department of Defense to competitively procure electric power in the
most timely, economic, and efficient manner?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Initial analysis of the primary and secondary research questions
began with archival research. Federal statutes, regulations, studies,
and publications were the basic starting points. Federal court cases
and electric utility industry publications were also identified and
reviewed during this phase. From the initicd review, a list of questions
was developed and used in the second phase of this study— personal
and telephone interviews. These interviews of knowledgeable individ-
uals in the electric utility industry. Department of Defense, Depart-
ment of Energy, state regulatory agencies, and consumer/industry
interest groups amplified the basic archival research and suggested
areas of further research. As ideas and questions developed, key indi-
viduals were contacted, as necessary, for clarification. This approach
was considered necessary to keep abreast of the most recent events
and insure accuracy of concepts and ideas based on current and past
events.
E. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH
The research is divided into five chapters. In this chapter, the
identification of the research questions, methodologies, objectives,
and direction of effort have been presented.
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Chapter II presents an overview of the electric utility industry:
organization, market history, infrastructure, rate subsidization, and
power wheeling. This chapter is intended to provide some under-
standing of the electrical utility industry. It is not intended to be a
technical discussion. Details are presented as necessary to develop
concepts. The areas presented are not inclusive but they are
important.
Chapter III is a review of specific policies (congressional and
Department of Defense), statutes, regulations, and pertinent court
cases. This chapter does not present all policies, etc., but only those
that are the most pertinent to competitive procurement within the
Department of Defense.
Chapter IV is an analysis of required conditions and possible
strategies procurement officers might use in competitive procurement
of electrical power. The analysis is based on the premise that com-
petitive procurement of electricity is desirable. The analysis is not
presented as inclusive. It is intended to show that there are strate-
gies, methods, and reasons that will allow judicious competitive pro-
curement when circumstances require or warrant it.
Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations developed
as a result of this research study. This chapter also provides a short
list of areas for further study.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE ELECTRICAL UTILITY INDUSTRY
A. ELECTRICAL UTILITY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION
Electricity is a unique commodity; it cannot be manufactured or
processed prior to use. Electricity is consumed as it is generated.
Electrical supply is usually viewed as. a monopolistic industry: The
lowest average cost (of producing electricity) can be reached only
when there is a single producer. If there are multiple producers,
monopoly theory holds, there will be needless duplication of facilities.
This facility duplication will increase the average cost of service above
the theoretical (monopoly) minimum average cost. Allowed unfettered
competition, the lowest-cost producer is able to drive competitors out
of the market by increasing output and decreasing price. This case of
a single surviving supplier (the monopolist), in a market-controlled
competition, occurs only in natural monopolies.^
This market trend was essentially what happened in the early
1900s. Customers were soon unable to go to anyone else for service.
This prompted the Federal Power Act of 1935, which established
regulatory powers and responsibilities at the federal and state level.
This regulation of electric utilities established certain policies:
1. Cross-class subsidies such that certain customer classes do not
carry their true cost-of-service;
2. Capitalization of costs, on the theory that cost recovery is assured
by regulation;
1Mansfield, Edwin, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications, 5th ed.,
p. 277, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, NY, 1985.
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3. Low depreciation rates;
4. Risk underestimation, on the theory that regulators would pro-
vide relief if required;
5. Federal regulation of interstate bulk power transactions;
6. State regulation of intrastate and retail power sales;
7. Vertical integration by utilities to achieve economies of scale and
quality service.
2
In order to reap the benefits of a monopoly, while simultaneously
protecting its citizens from monopoly dangers, state governments
grant utility companies sole service rights to areas. Within the service
areas, counties and cities grant utilities exclusive operating franchises.
In order to protect the monopolist and its customers, state govern-
ments typically establish a public utility commission (or similar body)
to review utility operations and set rates and tariffs for services pro-
vided by the monopolist.
Responding to the regulatory and commercial environment, elec-
tric utilities developed three district phases of operations: (1) Gener-
ation—the transformation of one form or energy (coal, oil, gas, etc.)
into electricity; (2) Transmission— moving the transformed energy
from the generation point to the area of use; and (3) Distribution— low-
voltage (typically below 34,500 volts) distribution of energy in urban
and rural areas. Title 15, United States Code (USC), section 79b
defines an electrical utility as:
... any company that owns or operates facilities used for the genera-
tion, transmission, or distribution of electric energy for sale ... [a
2phillips, Charles F., Jr., "The Changing Structure of the Public Utility
Sector," Public Utilities Fortnightly, January 9, 1986, p. 16.
13
company is] not to be an electric utility if ... such a company is pri-
marily engaged in one or more businesses other than the business of
being an electric utility company....
^
Clearly, an electric utility may consist of any combination of gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution facilities. Within the electric
utility industry, electric utilities are further subdivided into private
(investor) and public (federal, state, municipal, and cooperatives)
owned utilities.
While not required, it is rare when an eligible electric utility is
not a member of the North American Electric Reliability Council
(NERC). The NERC is subdivided into nine regional councils set up to
assist member utilities and improve the reliability of transmission and
generation of wholesale electric power. Five of the regions are divided
into subregions. Reliability is the ability of the electric utility system
to continue to provide electricity in the event of single or multiple
component failures. These components may be parts of generation,
transmission, and/or distribution facilities. A highly reliable system is
one able to provide electricity if two, or more, major components fail
without a noticeable or sustained effect. Simply stated, reliability is
usually redundancy.
Some NERC regions and subregions are experimenting with eco-
nomic dispatch (poobng) agreements. Under these agreements,
member utilities operate individual generation stations in the most
economical manner possible for the electrical load demanded. Multi-
ple metering stations record quantities and direction of power flow
315 U.S.C. 796(a)(3), United States Code, V. 5. p. 380, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1986.
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and member utilities calculate how much power each utility used and
how much power each utility generated. Uses are usually customer
retail and wholesale demands. However, some wholesale demands are
non-cash payments for power used at different times. If so, such
payments are usually included (or allowed) in the pooling agreement.
This time may have been yesterday, last week, last month, or last sys-
tem peak (summer or winter). The purpose of pooling agreements is
to avoid building new capacity by utilizing existing capacity more effi-
ciently. They also inject free market choice into the wholesale side of
electric utility operations.
Pooling agreements are relatively new within the electric utility
industry. They have gained real headway only since clear authority to
form them was granted by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA). To understand PURPA, it is necessary to understand
the recent market history of the electric industry.
B. RECENT ELECTRICAL MARKET HISTORY
In the 1950s and early 1960s, electric rates declined as a result
of falling fuel prices and the ability of electrical utilities to take advan-
tage of economies of scale. Public utility oversight and rate setting
during this period was very casual and cordial. It consisted mainly of
the public utility commission (PUC) meeting and agreeing to rate
decreases requested by the electric utilities. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, costs and rates started going up. The primary causes
were environmental concerns, increasing fuel costs, and inflation. As
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electric rates started increasing, the cordial atmosphere between the
public utility commission and electrical utilities began evaporating.
Neither side was truly prepared for an adversarial relationship,
but it developed an)rway. Public utility commissioners of this period
were usually political appointees or elected politicians with scant util-
ity experience. The PUC staff, while knowledgeable, was usually over-
worked as rate intervenors (protestors) grew in number and political
influence. Public Utility Commissions began questioning the plans,
policies, and actions of electric utilities. Friction and resentment
developed on all sides. This friction was a by-product of all sides
coming to grip with the new realities of the period (environmental
issues, increasing fuel prices, legislative fuel bans, litigation, court
delays, new mandated rates by legislators, etc.). Public utility
commissions had to increase their staffs, electric utilities had to prove
their proposals were prudent, and customers became more aware of
the costs associated with any action.
Utility rate increases could be postponed directly by PUC action
and indirectly by political action. Consumers used both of these paths
to challenge the requested utility rate increases. As as result of
increased consumerism (in the mid 1970s), electric utilities found
conservation measures were the least expensive "new" source of elec-
tric power.
Because of the new rates fostered by courts, commissions, and
legislatures, cogeneration started looking attractive to industrial cus-
tomers as new turbine technology was incorporated into smaller
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generation plants. Additionally, the new rates mandated by legisla-
tures, et ai, meant industrial customers increased their subsidization
of non-industrial customers. Cogeneration is typically thought of as
the ability to use steam for two separate purposes (e.g., electricity
generation and heating). Concurrent with these developments, Amer-
ican industry lost its dominant manufacturing position. Industry had
to look at all costs and it found energy to be a significant portion of
them. Cogeneration appeared to offer a way to cut costs and regain
lost ground in manufacturing. This had the effect of increasing the
cross-class subsidization burden of the industrial and commercial
customers that remained.
In response to the concerns of consumers, manufacturers, indus-
trialists, et al., and concurrently with the spirit of deregulation.
Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (of 1978).
This act was intended to encourage energy conservation, national rate-
making standards, and efficient utilization of resources and facilities.
The act also granted special status and rights to non-utility producers
of electricity. This was done to encourage small power producers and
cogeneration development.
Forced by the market to become more efficient, American indus-
try did so. Energy utilities were squeezed to grant concessions to
large industrial and commercial customers or lose them as they
switched to self-generation and/or cogeneration. This pressure con-
tinues today. Large industrial customers are continuing their efforts to
fight what they see as unfair cross-class subsidization.
17
C. ELECTRICAL UTILITY INDUSTRY INFRASTRUCTURE
Electricity is generated at low (typically less than 15,000 volt)
voltage levels. Because power plants are usually quite distant from
electrical load centers (cities, etc.) and because it is not economical to
transport power at low voltage levels, the voltage level of the gener-
ated power is increased. The exact voltage level for power transmis-
sion is governed by technology and economics. While the transmission
grid is spoken of as a homogeneous entity, it is actually composed of
transmission lines at many voltage levels. These levels range from
over 1,000,000 volts (1000 kV) to 34,500 volts (34.5 kV). The
transmission grid is spoken of as a single entity because the individual
transmission lines are interconnected via substations and switching
stations. These stations control, transform, and direct electrical
power to areas of need and give the transmission grid the appearance
of homogeneity.
After the generated power is increased to the desired voltage
level, it is placed (injected) into the transmission grid. The longer the
distance to the point of use and/or the greater the amount of power to
be transmitted, the higher the voltage level of the transmission line.
Once the power arrives near the point it is to be used, it goes through
a series of voltage decreases (step-down trar^sformations). Depending
on their size and need, some industrial customers cam utilize electric-
ity at these initially decreased (typically 230,000 volt-34,500 volt)
voltage levels. However, for the majority of customers it is necessary
to reduce the power to levels below 34,500 volts.
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After it has been reduced to 34,500 volts, and below, the gener-
ated power is considered to be at distribution voltage level. Once at
this level, the generated power is transported via the distribution grid
through urban and rural areas to its point of ultimate use. It is this
distribution voltage level and distribution grid that most consumers
are acquainted with. This grid is also what industrial and commercial
customers are subsidizing when they are charged rates that don't
reflect the true cost of providing their class of service.
D. CROSS-CLASS SUBSIDIZATION
Cross-class subsidization occurs when one class of consumers is
charged a portion of the costs required to provide service to a sepa-
rate class of consumers. This subsidy is usually considered unfair by
those against whom it is assessed. In very competitive industries, this
additional charge is often significant enough to be a meaningful con-
sideration when discussing pricing options and long-term manufac-
turing strategies. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, cross-class sub-
sidies were often the marginal amount that decided whether self-gen-
eration or cogeneration was an economical option. Besides being a
societal cost assessed on a class of consumers without fully assessing
its impact (on critical industries), this policy had the effect of subsi-
dizing consumers able to pay their full share. However, because of
political influence and other considerations, public utility commissions
and legislators did not assess residential consumers their full share of
service costs. This made it economically feasible for large industrial
and commercial customers to consider other electricity alternatives.
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Most electrical utilities recognize that, as large industrial and
commercial customers leave their systems, the remaining customers
are going to be assessed higher rates. This was necessary to cover the
fixed costs of facilities and overhead necessary to provide the level of
service demanded by most classes of customers. Recently, electrical
utilities have convinced PUCs that certain cross-class subsidizations
embedded in then-current rates are not in the best long-term inter-
ests of core customers. Core customers are defined as those unable to
leave the elec*": grid or replace the electrical service offered by the
utility. As a consequence, and in recognition, of large customers' abil-
ity to leave the electrical system, electrical utilities have evolved a new
marketing strategy. They will set rates to cover all variable costs of
generating electricity and as much of the fixed costs as possible. This
is done to keep as many customers as possible in existing rate bases.
If negotiated rates do not exceed variable costs, it is not prudent for a
utility to attempt to keep a customer,^
When electric utilities offer special rates to customers able to
leave their systems, it further exacerbates the situation for those
commercial customers who are unable to leave and who still pay the
cross-class subsidy. Some of those who elect to remain are able to
leave but feel some responsibility and comity for other customers in
the system. These customers don't (as a rule) want special rates:
"^Interview with John C. Keyser, Vice-President, Marketing and Cus-
tomer Services, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San Francisco, CA,
August 21, 1987.
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They want rates that reflect the true cost of servicing their needs.
5
The Department of Defense has been one of these customers.
E. ELECTRIC POWER WHEELING
When electrical generation first began, electrical generation
machines (generators) were relatively small. They were located within
a few miles of the electrical devices they served and, as often as not,
they were direct current— low voltage— devices (much like a battery).
As technology developed and electrical demand grew, electric utilities
started generating and transmitting alternating current (AC) electric-
ity. This allowed larger, more efficient generating stations to be
located further from the electrical demand they were built to serve.
AS the size of generators grew, and transmission technology devel-
oped, generation plants were located further and further away from
major urban areas, and loads. This was often the result of economics
(e.g., coal mines for fuel supply) or necessity (e.g., hydroelectric).
With the ability to transmit electric power long distances and over
large geographic areas came the opportunity to compete with and
assist neighboring electric utilities. It was now economical to transmit
power over distances greater than most utility service areas covered.
As utilities continued to look for methods to improve efficiency and
reliability, the economics of mutual support agreements between utili-
ties became quite evident. Rather than build a new plant for a small
load lasting only a few hours (peak load), it was wiser to buy power
^Interview with Dr. John A. Anderson, Executive Director, Electricity
Consumers Resource Council, Washington, DC, September 2, 1987.
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from a utility with temporary excess generating capability. Rather
than build a large plant for system reliability (back up), it made more
sense for several area utilities to sign support agreements to supply
power for temporary or emergency needs. The method of supplying
this supporting power is called "wheeling,"
Wheeling is a "term of art" describing the capability of transmit-
ting generated power from one designated point to a second desig-
nated point through the transmission or distribution lines of two or
more intermediate utilities. ^ A «.xample of such a transaction is an
agreement between Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM),
San Diego Gas and Electric Company (SDG&E). and several other
electric utilities. The agreement obligates PNM to provide 236,000
kw of electric power for use by SDG&E. The power is generated in
the northwest corner of New Mexico and transmitted to a switchyard
near Phoenix, Arizona. San Diego Gas and Electric Company takes
delivery at the switchyard and is responsible for arrangements neces-
sary to wheel the power to the San Diego system. In order to do this,
SDG&E has signed agreements with three utilities to wheel power. A
few other utilities are involved in the agreement with emergency sup-
port and standby roles. The total distance the power must travel is
approximately 600 miles. The agreement appears complex, Dut in
^Schweppe, Fred C, Roger E. Bohn, and N. Michael C. Caramanis,
Wheeling Rates: An Economic-Engineering Foundation, p. 1-1, United
States Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, TN, 1985.
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reality the concept is simple. It involves many utilities, yet it is just
one of hundreds of such wheeling agreements currently in effectJ
Traditionally, when one utility wheeled power for another utility, a
red line was drawn on a map (of the transmission grid) tracing a path
that theoretically was able to absorb and transport the power that was
to be wheeled. In actuality, electrical power did not flow (exactly) in
such a manner. Historically, however, the system of red-lining
worked sufficiently well to overlook small discrepancies in power
flows. This was due t". »:he excess capacity of transmission grid and
the electric industry's inability to measure (in real or near real time)
what the power flows on the transmission grid really were. Today
neither situation normally exists. The transmission grid is nearing full
utilization and remote sensors and cheaper computers allow near real
time monitoring of the entire transmission grid.
Being able to predict transmission grid behavior is important not
only because of wheeling costs but also because of significant reliabil-
ity, capacity, and protection concerns. For example, a few years ago a
new transmission line was brought into service in the New Mexico-
Arizona NERC subregion of the Western States Coordinating Council
(WSCC) NERC region. When connected, the actual line power flow was
in a direction opposite of what was expected. This was quite surpris-
ing to the companies involved in connecting the new line. It also
affected power flows throughout the entire Western United States
^DHR Inc., Case Studies in Major Bulk-Power Transactions, pp. III-l,
III-3, Report No. DOE/PE/70027-TI, United States Department of
Energy, Oak Ridge, TN, 1982.
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from New Mexico to Washington. The unexpected power flows altered
the system and transmission grid reliabihty for the entire WSCC
region. In order to operate the new transmission line as intended,
many changes had to be made in generator and generation plant dis-
patch procedures in the WSCC. Transmission grid configuration and
protection practices were also affected until additional lines could be
brought into service to restore total system reliability to former relia-
bility levels. This incident taught everyone involved much about sys-
tem reliability and operations. JL^lso highlighted the importance of
coordination and disclosure of intentions and operations between
interconnected electric utilities.
For many reasons, wheeling does not affect a transmission grid
the same way each time power is wheeled. Usually, the effect of
wheeling will be substantially the same, given similar system loading.
However, because of different consumer demand curve characteristics
(daily and seasonal), different transmission grid characteristics (lines
in and out of use), and different utility generation schedules (units in
and out of service), the actual effects of a wheeling transaction are
almost impossible to predict with complete accuracy. If demand
curves etc. are known a meaningful prediction is usually possible, but
long-term accuracy of the model is not assured.
To calculate the true cost and effects of wheeling power, it will be
necessary to evaluate (among other items) the transaction effect on:
1. Line losses due to new power flows;
2. Transmission grid reliability and security;
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3. Generation and generator dispatch; and
4. Transmission grid power flow constraints.
The purpose of this evaluation is to encourage utilities to offer
wheeling as a service and to compete for electrical loads when it is
economical and profitable to do so.^ In order to establish what the
true costs of wheeling are, it will be necessary for the regional and
subregional reliability councils, and their member companies, to provide
power flow data and system models to prospective wheeling entities,
other utilities, geothermal power producers, small power producers,
and qualifying cogenerators. Historically, this is something utilities
are reluctant to do. One point worth observing is that many utilities
provide some of this information to educational institutions. This is
done to expose prospective utility engineers to the tools and tech-
niques that utilities use in day-to-day operations. While sensitive
information, it is hardly proprietary information. Public availability of
such information is necessciry or it will be difficult, if not impossible,
to know who should pay whom when wheeling is accomplished.
Because all wheeling displaces power and affects system power flows,
the net power loss for some utilities may be lower when they are
wheeling outside power than when they are not. In such a situation,
the entity injecting the power into the grid should receive some of the
overall benefits that other grid users are receiving. This is the corol-
lary of paying for increased system expenses created by wheeling.
^Ibid., p. 1-1.
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The ability to transmit, or wheel, power across utility service ter-
ritories is very important to electric system reliability. This capacity is
also crucial to the ability of procurement officers to compete electrical
requirements between utilities that are not adjacent to a federal
installation. Because it is such a crucial element of both competition
and system reliability, extreme care must be exercised in the use of
wheeling. The most accurate method of determining the system
effects of new wheeling proposals is computer simulation of the pro-
posed wheeling power flows. For verification pur^ ^.es, all system
models and parameters must be available to interested parties for
checks and cross-checks. If wheeling proposed in response to a
competitive procurement degrades electrical system reliability, it
should be rejected. If the opposite is true— system reliability is
improved or unchanged by the new wheeling— the proposed wheeling
should be allowed if the proposed plan is the best offered.
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in. COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT GUIDANCE AND POLICIES
A. CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE
The Congress finds ... it is in the interest of the United States that
property and services be acquired for the Department of Defense in
the most timely, economic, and efficient manner. It is therefore the
policy of congress that ... full and open competitive procedures shall
be used by the Department of Defense...? [10 USC §230 1(a)]
An executive agency in conducting a procurement for property or
services— (A) shall obtain full and open competition through the use
of competitive procedures in accordance with the requirements of
this title ... and (B) shall use the competitive procedure or combina-
tion of competitive procedures that is best suited under the circum-
stances of the procurement. 10 [The Competition in Contracting Act of
1984]
Competition is the philosophy of the American marketplace.
Congress has endured, aided, and mandated competition from its ear-
liest sessions. Though it deals specifically with small business, con-
gressional support for competition is best described in United States
Code Title 15— Commerce and Trade:
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise
is free competition. Only through full and free competition can free
markets, free entry into business and opportunities for the expres-
sion and growth of personal initiative and individual judgement be
assured. The preservation and expansion of such competition is
basic not only to the economic well-being but to the security of this
nation. ^ ^
910 U.S.C. 2301(a), United States Code, Supplement III, v. 1, p. 610,
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1986.
lOPublic Law 98-369, Title VII Competition in Contracting, July 18,
1974, United Statutes at Large, v. 98.1, 98 Stat. 1175, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1986.
1115 U.S.C. 631(a), p. 557.
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Regulated markets are rarely efficient markets. Replacing
competition with regulation leads to ineffective and inefficient regula-
tory processes, uneven and unfair tariffs, burdensome delays, and
reliance on rules instead of principles and sound judgment. Congress
has recognized these facets of regulated markets and in the recent
past has moved to deregulate most regulated industries (e.g., trans-
portation and communications). Congress' affirmation of the public
marketplace as the arbitrator of the most effective and efficient
method of suppling goods and services is the bedroc^: ^f all federal
procurement policy.
Procurement of electrical power by the DoD is guided primarily by
Public Law 80-413, ASPA, and Pubhc Law 93-369, CICA. These
statutes are codified in Chapter 137 (Procurement Generally), Title 10
(Armed Forces), United States Code. Electrical power procurements
are affected by court decisions involving not only these cardinal
statutes but also:
1. Public Law 95-617, Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,
(PURPA); and
2. Chapter 647, 26 Statute 209 (1980), as amended, the Sherman
Act.
More than any others, these statutes and regulations embody the prin-
cipals of federal procurement and parameterize the options available
to procurement officers.
B. FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the land ...
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Every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 12
In 1974, Congress directed the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to improve the procurement policies and procedures of the
federal government; it did this via Public Law 93-400, OFPPA. An
Office of Federal Procurement Policy was established within the OMB
on 30 August 1974. Congress gave the administrator of this office
authority to prescribe and establish a system of coordinating uniform
procurement policies, regulations, procedures and forms in accor-
dance with applicable laws for procurement of property and services. ^^
On 1 April 1984, after nine and one-half years of effort, the System of
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) became effective.
For procurements of utility services, the FAR directed the contin-
ued use of Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) Supple-
ment Number 5, dated 1 October 1974. The supplement recognizes
that utilities generally operate in franchised areas and frequently are
in a "sole source" position. It also notes that service must be provided
"at reasonable rates without unjust discrimination." ^"^ However, the
supplement is silent as to what unjust discrimination is.
For new military installations where competition does exist, pro-
posals will be solicited from all potential suppliers, even if a GSA area
^^Constitution of the United States, Article VI, clause 2.
i^Public Law 93-400, Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, August
30, 1974, United States Statutes at Large, v. 88.1, section 6, 88 Stat.
797, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1976.
^^Procurement of Utility Services, Armed Services Procurement Reg-
ulation Supplement Number 5, pp. 55-102, October 1, 1974.
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contract exists. For existing installations, competition is directed
when (1) a prospective supplier requests the opportunity to serve,
and/ or (2) when the department concerned became aware of another
potential supplier, i^ in this situation. Supplement Number 5 further
directs that competition will be initiated when it is "most advanta-
geous to the Government." ^6
When Congress passed PURPA on 9 November 1978. it signifi-
cantly altered the regulatory policies and atmosphere of the electrical
utility industry. Title I of PURPA establishes eleven rate design stan-
dards. The intent of the eleven standards is to encourage: (1) con-
servation of energy: (2) efficient use of resources and facilities; and (3)
equitable rates. One federal standard worth particular note is the
cost-of-service standard. This is the first standard listed. It requires
class rates to reflect the costs of providing service to that class. It also
requires identification of the components used to differentiate the
costs of each class of service. The effect of PURPA on utility competi-
tion is significant in three ways:
1. PURPA did nothing to affect the applicability of antitrust laws to
any electric utility:





3. State laws affecting the "voluntary coordination of electric utili-
ties, including any agreement for central dispatch" i'' are condi-
tionally invalidated.
The total effect of these (and other) PURPA provisions is to inject
competitive forces and competition into the environment of a regu-
lated industry.
The first point above is significant because the US Supreme Court
ruled on 22 February 1973 that electric utilities are not immune from
antitrust regulation. ^^ In the case of Otter Tail Power Company v.
United States, 410 US 366 (1973). the Supreme Court found:
Use of monopoly power to destroy threatened competition is a
violation of the "Attempt to Monopolize" clause of the Sherman Act,
as are agreements not to compete with the aim of preserving or
extending a monopoly. ^^
The court also found that "Government contracting officers do not
have power to grant immunity from the Sherman Anti-Trust [sicl
Act/^o Prior to this case, the prevailing assumption within the elec-
tric utility industry was that the Federal Power Act of 1935 (via fran-
chises and regulation) precluded the application of antitrust laws to
electric utilities. If Congress did not intend to foster competition with
PURPA, the act could have exempted the utility industry from
antitrust. Congress did not, and PURPA does not.
1716 U.S.C. 824A-1(A). United States Code, v. 6, p. 851, Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1983
^^Otter Tail Power Company v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973),
Supreme Court Reporter, v. 93, pp. 1022-1038, West Publishing Co.,




action. Congress placed conservation and efficient use of resources
above purely state concerns, insofar as those concerns restricted a
utility company's ability to respond to market realities. Recalling the
deregulation of the oil and natural gas industries, it appears that
Congress intends to allow electrical utilities a somewhat flexible
response in dealing with new competitive impacts in the resource
markets (oil, coal, etc.).
Less than one year after its effective date of implementation.
Congress directed modifications to the FAR via the CICA. These mod-
ifications were intended to increase preference for competitive pro-
curement within executive agencies subject to the FAR. The measure
of Congress' seriousness regarding this competitive procurement
preference is found in CICA's major directives: (1) it created seven
allowable exceptions to full and open competitive procurements; (2) it
required the establishment of competition advocates in each executive
agency and procuring activity; and (3) it directed each competition
advocate's attention to challenging barriers to full and open
competition.
The House version of the CICA included an exception to full and
open competition for utilities procurement; the Senate version did
not. During the reconciliation process, the utilities procurement
exception was eliminated. It is certainly not reasonable to conclude
from this action, and other actions of Congress, that competition of
electric utility services was overlooked during the CICA debate. Since
Congress did not grant an exception to full and open competition for
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The second point above is significant to competition because
Congress exempted qualifying small power producers and qualifying
cogenerators (commonly called QFs) from most provisions of PURPA
and the Federal Power Act of 1935. It also included special rules
requiring electrical utilities to: (1) purchase QF power; and (2) sell
QFs' power at fair and reasonable rates, respecting the minimum reli-
ability of QFs even during emergencies. This special status of QFs was
underscored when Congress amended the Public Utility Holding Act of
1935 to allow utility companies subject to the act:
... [to] acquire or retain, in any geographical area, any interest in any
qualifying co-generation facilities as defined [by PURPA ... The QF
with electrical utility in partnership] shall qualify for any exemption
relating to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act,... 21
This action grants utility companies unambiguous entry into the
unregulated field of QFs. They are free to obtain up to 50-percent
partnership of any QF, anywhere in the country, irrespective of state
laws. This action also has the effect of freeing utility companies to
operate in competitive markets.
The third point above is significant because it allows electric utili-
ties to enter into voluntary agreements based purely on the economics
of market conditions. Any existing state laws prohibiting pooling
agreements are voided if: (1) the agreement is "designed to obtain
economical utilization of facilities and resources"; (2) the state laws
are not required by federal law; or (3) the state law is not designed to
protect the public health, safety, welfare, or environment. By this
2115 U.S.C. 79 k.. Supplement III, v. 1, p. 1070.
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electrical utilities, the Department of Defense must compete require-
ments for such services.
One additional note on antitrust is appropriate at this point.
Cross-referenced to Chapter 1, Monopolies and Combinations in
Restraint of Trade, Title 15, Commerce and Trade, is section 803 of
Title 16, Conservation:
Combinations, agreements, arrangements, or understandings,
expressed or implied, to limit trade, or to fix, maintain, or increase
prices for electrical energy or service are hereby prohibited. 22
In Otter Tail supra, the Supreme Court did not cite this passage
specifically. However, in view of federal law developments since 1973
(when Otter TaU was decided), the significance of this passage to com-
petitive procurement of electric utility services is very important to
determine. Because PURPA allows utilities to enter into economic
dispatch (pooling) agreements and unregulated QF agreements, it is
reasonable to infer that participating utilities are potential competitors
for fulfilling federal power requirements.
Assuming, arguendo, that the most effective mix of generating
plants will be operated for a given load range, there exists only an
accounting exercise to determine what portion of the load "belongs"
to each utility. Since economic generation to meet the area load is an
area of concern, any one of the participating utilities is capable of
"claiming" federal energy requirements as part of "its" load. It is
reasonable to infer that 16 USC 803 requires electric utilities to
2216 U.S.C. 803(h), p. 839.
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compete for energy sales. Again assuming, arguendo, that this is true,
as a consequence of Otter Tail supra, when economic dispatch agree-
ments are in force competition exists,
C. COURT DECISIONS
The customer's goal is to obtain the most value for their money. For
commodities that often means buying the cheapest offering ...
Whether the product is common or unique, customers will base
their decisions on the value of the transaction to themselves rather
than to the selling firm. 23 [The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing]
Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the US Constitution gives
Congress the power to exercise exclusive authority over all places pur-
chased for military installations. Department of Defense contracts that
disregard state franchises and regulatory controls are often subject to
legal challenge. With few exceptions, such contracts are found to be
valid. If Congress directs a policy, state actions cannot modify or reg-
ulate the activities carried out pursuant to that policy. The exception
to this is when Congress relinquishes, or shares, sovereignty so that
federal activities become subject to state action (e.g., environmental
regulation). There are two basic Supreme Court decisions involving
federal procurement and state franchise regulation: (1) Penn Dairies,
Inc. V. Milk Control Comm., 318 US 261 (1943); and (2) Pacific Coast
Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture of California, 318 US 285
(1943).
In the first milk case, Penn Dairies, supra, the US Army contracted
with a local milk supplier in accordance with competitive
23Nagle, Thomas T., The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing, p. 2, Prentice-
Hall, Inc.. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987.
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procurement regulations in force at the time. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania denied the milk supplier a license to operate (and
deliver milk) because the contract delivery price was below the state-
regulated minimum. Delivery of the milk was contracted for (and the
US Army was operating on) a military encampment located on lands
belonging to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The US Supreme
Court found:
The burdens placed upon [the] national government as a result of
states' regulation of their internal affairs, save as Congress may act to
remove them, constitute normal incidents of operation within same
territory of a dual system of government, and no immunity of
nation^ government from such burdens is to be implied from the
Constitution.24
In the absence of congressional policy setting "... aside local regula-
tions affecting price in order to secure lowest possible cost, "25 the
court found Pennsylvania's regulation of minimum milk prices "did
not impose an unconstitutional burden ... or otherwise infringe the
Constitution of the United States. "26
In the second milk case. Pacific Coast supra, the War Department
contracted for the delivery of milk on Moffett Field, California (an area
owned by, and under exclusive jurisdiction of, the federal govern-
ment). The contract was made with a local milk supplier in
24penn Dairies Inc. v. MUk Control Commission of Pennsylvania, 318 U.S.
261 (1943), Supreme Court Reporter, v. 63. p. 618, West Publishing




accordance with applicable competitive procurement procedures in
force at the time. Sales and delivery under the contract occurred on
Moffett Field. The State of California initiated proceedings to revoke
the milk distributor's operating license because the contract delivery
price was below the state-regulated minimum. In this case, the court
found:
The State of California was not authorized to enforce minimum price
regulations with respect to milk sold to War Department at Moffett
Field on theory that the act regulated only conduct of California's
citizens within California Territory, in view of fact that Moffett Field
was under exclusive jurisdiction of [the] federal government.27
It is interesting to note that in 1941, the State of California memori-
alized Congress, "requesting passage of a federal law requiring pur-
chasing officers ... to refuse bids for milk at prices below those fixed
under California Milk Stabilization Law. "28 The memorial was referred
to committees in both the House and Senate, but no congressional
action was taken.
Since 1943, the federal government has instituted a comprehen-
sive set of regulations designed to promote fair and reasonable rates
through competitive and negotiated procurement. Of these two
methods, full and open competitive procurement is preferred. Several
additional US Supreme Court cases have underscored the federal
government's authority to seek rates substantially equal to, or lower
^'^Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture of California, et
al, 318 U.S. 285 (1943), Supreme Court Reporter, v. 63, p. 628, West
Publishing Co.. St. Paul, MN, 1943.
28/b(d., p. 629.
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than, those mandated bj?- state regulatory agencies. It is particularly
noteworthy that, in these cases, the Supreme Court found, in effect,
that the procurement policies promulgated as a consequence of the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 established a congressional
policy regarding factors such as price. As a result, local regulations
that infringe on this federal policy are subject to the supremacy clause
[supra] of the Constitution.
In a transportation case (a regulated industry). Public Utilities
Con. .^sion of California v. United States, 355 US 534 (1958), the U. S.
Supreme Court held that the State of California could not limit trans-
portation of government property at reduced rates. California allowed
reduced rates for US Government property, but only after the Public
Utility Commission of California first gave its approval of those rates.
The court found this requirement imposed restraints
upon federal procurement officials who, under congressional comi-
prehensive policy governing requirement, are entrusted with dis-
cretion to determine when existing rates will be accepted and when
negotiation for lower rates will be undertaken.29
The court found that the conflict between federal and state regulations
was clearly resolved by the supremacy clause (Article 6, clause 2) of
the Constitution. Borrowing from an earlier ruling, the court quoted:
It is the very essence of the supremacy to rem.ove all obstacles to its
action within its own sphere, and so to modiiy every power vested in
^^Public Utilities Commission of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534,
Supreme Court Reporter, v. 78, pp. 446-447, West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, MN. 1959.
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subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from
their influence. -^^
In another transportation case. United States v. Georgia Public
Service Commission, 371 U.S. 285 (1963) the US Supreme Court held
that,
Georgia regulations requiring higher rates on shipments must yield
to [the] lower rate in [the] contract between carrier and General
Services Administration for intrastate transportation of household
goods of federal employees. ^i
Lower courts had held that, because the property was not strictly
military, the case was controlled by Penn Dairies, supra. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument and held that, between 1943,
... when Penn Dairies was decided, and 1958, when Public Utilities
Comm. of California [supra] was decided. Congress enacted the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 62 Stat. 21, later codified
without substantial change, 70A Stat. 127, 10 USC §2301 et seq.,
"which extended and elaborated the federal procurement policy of
negotiated rates ... We have then a federal procurement policy of
negotiated rates for transporting household goods of federal
employees— a policy as clear and as explicit as the federal policy for
transporting military supplies involved in Public Utilities Comm. of
California, supra.'' The Georgia policy, which is opposed to this fed-
eral policy, must accordingly give way.32
In another milk case, Paul v. United States, 371 US 245 (1963),
the Supreme Court held California price regulations "were not appli-
cable to sales of miilk for strictly military consumption and for resale at
^^Ibid., p. 453.
^^ United States v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 371 U.S. 285
(1963), Supreme Court Reporter, v. 83, p. 397, West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, MN. 1963.
32/bid., pp. 399 and 402.
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federal commissaries ...."33 This case is significant because the
Supreme Court found:
References to rates or prices "fixed by law or regulations" in 1962
procurement statute [sic] are merely minor collateral accommoda-
tions to those situations where, within limits of federal procurement
regulations and the statute, the federal procurement official decided
that the practical way to obtain the supplies needed is by following
state price-fixing or rate-fixing system, and statute [sic] does not
show a congressional purpose to abandon competitive bidding or
show a desire to make the federal procurement policy bow to state
price-fixing in the face of contrary policy expressed in the Pro-
curement Regulation, 10 USCA. §§2304(g), 2305(a,c) 2306(f).34
The court noted that the procurement policies governing the pro-
curement of supplies and services were the same ones governing
transportation of commodities {United States v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, supra). It went on to find that the present procurement
regulations have the force of law and "... Its unqualified command is
that purchases for the Armed Forces be made on a competitive basis
..."35 No allowances or exceptions were made for earlier court find-
ings that a federal "hands ofT policy existed respecting minimum
price laws of the states [Penn Dairies, supra). Procurement regulations
only provide for the waiver of "cost or pricing" data if prices have
been set by law or regulation. 36 This case is also significant because
the US Supreme Court noted that it would have disposed of the case
33 Charges Paul, Director of Agriculture of California, et al v. United
States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963), Supreme Court Reporter, v. 83. p. 426,





without ruling on the issue of exclusive jurisdiction if some of the milk
had not been purchased out of nonappropriated funds. While not
plainly stated, it would be reasonable to infer that exclusive jurisdic-
tion is a moot point for goods and services intended for official mili-
tary purposes.
The last case to be discussed deals squarely with federal pro-
curement of electrical power using competitive procurement proce-
dures. In 1984, the US Air Force solicited bids for additional power
requiremeriis at Ellsworth Air Force Base. In response to this action
five suppliers submitted bids. The Air Force awarded the lowest bider
(Heartland Consumers Power District) a one-year contract in October
1984. On 24 November 1984, the locally franchised utility (an unsuc-
cessful bidder) filed a complaint with the South Dakota Public Utilities
Commission. In the complaint. Black Hills Power & Light argued that
Ellsworth Air Force Base is located in Black Hills' service territory and
was therefore required to obtain its electrical power (beyond that sup-
plied by an agency of the Department of Energy) from Black Hills. ^
7
The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) determined a second electric
utility (West River Electric Association) with a franchised service area
encompassing a portion of Ellsworth was also a party to the proceed-
ings. West River declined participation in the original case.
Subsequently, when the controversy ultimately found its way into the
^'^Black Hills Power and Light v. Casper W. Weinberger, et al, 808 F.2d
665 (8th Cir. 1987), No. 85-5418. United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, p. 5.
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courts. West River endorsed and adopted the arguments of the United
States.
Approximately 12 percent of Ellsworth's land is not under exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction, therefore the PUC determined it had
jurisdiction. In order to control power flow and prevent duplication of
facilities outside of the lands under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the
PUC reasoned it must control all electrical power sales on Ellsworth;
controlling the whole to control the part. The Appeals Court rejected
this analysis; first, beer?use the PUC could not avoid the supremacy
clause of the Constitution (the same argument failed in Pacific Coast
Diary, supra); and second, because during court proceedings the PUC
admitted that it had no authority to control the amount of energy sup-
plied by the Department of Energy's federal marketing agency.
Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). It further admitted that
WAPA could serve even the non-exclusive (shared) jurisdictional areas
of Ellsworth, and in fact had done so in the past. The Appeals Court
confirmed the District Court's finding that:
... the rationale that the commission's lack of authority to control the
flow of power to state-owned territory will result in unnecessary
duplication of electric facilities is without logic. However we need
not extend the jurisdiction of the United States beyond the borders
of federally-owned territory in order to hold that South Dakota has
no jurisdiction to prevent the United states from using competitive
bidding to purchase electric service for delivery within the (shared
jurisdiction) enclave.^^
The PUC and Black Hills asserted that state jurisdiction was
allowable because there was no interference with federal jurisdiction:
38Jbid., p. 12.
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Both the Federal District Court and the Federal Appeals Court found
this not to be the case. Both courts found that
... by ordering the United States to contract with a particular utility
based on an assigned service area, the South Dakota Public Utilities
Commission has directly interfered with the United States' control
over the provision of electrical service within the base.^^
As noted in this case, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in a case involving
utilities and territory with shared jurisdiction:
... recognized that allowing the state public service commission to
designate, based on specified service areas, the utility from which
the United States Government must purchase electricity would
interfere with cainying out the operations of the Air Force base.'^o
The Appeals Court noted this was a factually similar case, and that
state regulation of utility service to federal installations intrudes upon
the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'*
^
The last major argument in the case involved congressional intent.
Black Hills and the PUC argued Congress mandated that federal pro-
curement officers follow state law in purchasing electricity
(Supplement Number 5) and that "... federal law specifically defers to
state utilities franchise law and prevents Ellsworth from procuring







After carefully examining the relevant federal law, we must reject
this argument. Federal procurement law is specifically designed to
ensure "active competition so that the United States may receive
the most advantageous contractors [Paul 371 U..S at 253]
The Federal Appeals Court also found that "... Supplement No. 5 does
not require the federal government to defer to a state's regulation of
franchise territories; nothing in the new legislation changes this. "44
Thus, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals found nothing in Black Hills
Power and Light's (or the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission's)
arguments that precluded federal competitive procurement of electric
power. In October 1987, tiie US Supreme Court refused to consider
an appeal of Black Hills, supra.
The cases in this subsection can be summarized as follows:
1. In Penn Dairies, supra, the Supreme Court confirmed that individ-
ual states can regulate sales of goods and services if there is no
federal policy regarding them, and there is concurrent (shared)
jurisdiction on the military installation.
2. In Pacific Coast Dairy, supra, the Supreme Court confirmed that
the states cannot regulate sales of goods and services when such
items are for official purposes on lands without concurrent juris-
diction, even in the absence of a national federal policy.
3. In Public Utilities Commission of California, supra, the Supreme
Court noted that prior to 1958 (in 1947) Congress had estab-
lished a national procurement policy. Because of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution, individual states could not regulate
prices between the federal government and private individuals
for contracts dealing with government property.
4. In United States v. Georgia Public Service Commission, supra, the
Supreme Court expanded the right of the federal government to




property if the movement of such property was allowed by con-
gressional policy.
5. In Paul V. United States, supra, the Supreme Court confirmed the
right of the federal government to contract for goods and ser-
vices if such items were for official (or officially sanctioned) pur-
poses.
6. In Black Hills Power and Light Company v. Casper W. Weinberger,
et al, the Eighth Federal Appeals Court found the federal gov-
ernment has unqualified authority to competitively procure elec-
tric power on lands under exclusive federal jurisdiction. It
further found that the federal government need not defer to
utility franchise areas granted by state (local) authority when
contracting for electrical power.
In essence, the six cases outlint;d above show that Congress has estab-
lished a national policy for procurement of goods and services. The
US Supreme Court has found this policy allows procurement officers
to invoke the US Constitution's supremacy clause. When goods and
services are for official, or officially sanctioned, purposes, individual
states may not interfere with contracts for the procurement of such
goods or services.
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT POLICY^S
Competition is fundamental to our free enterprise system ... I call
upon each of you to assure that competition is the preferred method
of procurement in your departments or agencies. "^^ [Ronald Reagan]
... Department of Defense components are to place maximum
emphasis on competitive procurement. All personnel involved in
the acquisition process from the first identification of the
45lnterview with Millard E. Carr, Assistant for Facilities Energy, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC,
August 31, 1987.
^^Competition in Federal Procurement, Presidential Memorandum,
August 11, 1983.
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requirement through the execution of the purchase should
recognize this responsibility. Contracts will be placed on other than
a competitive basis only when clearly justified. "^"^ [Caspar Weinberger]
The Department of Defense (Department) has consistently fol-
lowed a policy of procuring adequate, reliable energy for the lowest
available cost. In general, the local utility's cost-of-service tariff has
been considered a fair measure of reasonable cost in a regulated envi-
ronment. Recognizing the benefits of competition, the Department
has also recognized that there are societal benefits in the existing fed-
eral and state regulatory environment. Implicit in this environment is
the concept of the "regulatory bargain": Each utility is obligated to
serve all customers in its service area in return for the right to operate
as a monopoly in that service area. Cognizant of the societal benefits of
monopoly franchises. Department utility policy operates on the belief
that federal procurement officers have the same alternatives as any
other utility customer.
Notwithstanding matters of jurisdiction, the Department, as a
matter of comity rather than law, normally procures electric power
from the locally franchised electric utility. The only exceptions to this
are: (1) where no state-granted franchise exists; (2) where more than
one state-granted franchise exists; and (3) where a qualified supplier
indicates desire and ability to provide the required electrical service.
The Department also holds that there are situations when procure-
ment officers should have the option of competitive procurement:
^"^Competitive Procurement, Secretary of Defense Memorandum,
September 9. 1982.
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1. when allowed by current contract;
2. when low-cost federal power allocations exist;
3. when discriminatory rates exist; and
4. when reliability of existing power supplies is inadequate for
Department needs.
On 7 May 1986, the FAR regulatory Council (of which the Depart-
ment is a member) proposed changes (Part 41, et seq. and Part 8.300,
et seq.) to the FAR reflecting the CICA and incorporating the provi-
sions of Armed Services Procurement Supplement No. 5. Within these
proposed regulations was the requirement that procurement
(contracting) officers perform a market survey to promote full and
open competition. The existence of a state-franchised service area, in
and of itself, was not sufficient justification to consider the franchise
holder a sole responsible source. Investor-owned electric utilities had
objections to the proposed FAR regulations implementing CICA direc-
tions. Individually and as a group they lobbied Congress to postpone
implementation of FAR Part 41 proposals.
The Appropriations Committee conference report directed the
Department of Defense not to implement changes proposed for the
purchase of utilities until they (the changes) had been presented to,
and approved by, the Appropriations Committee."*® The FY 1987
Defense Appropriations Act states:
48lnterview with LTC Bill C. Henry, Esq., Director, Air Force Utility
Rate Intervention Team, Tyndall Air Force Base, Panama City, FL,
August 27, 1987.
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None of the funds appropriated or made available by this act shall be
used to implement or enforce the rule proposed on May 7 1986 (51
Federal Register 16988-16991). ...49
This has resulted in the continued use of existing regulations: FAR
Subpart 8.3 and ASPR Supplement No. 5 (1974). Because Supplement
No. 5 was not included in the initial FAR revision of the ASPR, it was
grandfathered in for a period of two years. When the CICA modified
the FAR (and 10 USC 2301 et seq.), it demanded competition unless
the proposed procurement met one of seven statutory exceptions.
The effect of the FY 1987 Defense Appropriation Act language was
to halt fuU implementation of the OFPPA (FAR) and the CICA. This
direction also had the effect of limiting two high-visibility initiatives:
(1) third-party venture capital projects (to supply power require-
ments); and (2) increased DoD reliance on coal for energy require-
ments. Department of Defense participation in congressional
preferences for small power producers and self- or co-generation (as
expressed in PURPA) are similarly affected.
By refusing to act or allow the Department to act. Congress will
expose the Department and its services to criticism from proponents
of increased competition, proponents of decreased regulation, propo-
nents of increased venture capital projects, and critics of excessive
federal spending. A significant note is that, while Congress has
precluded new FAR regulations from taking effect, it has not relieved
the Department from following existing laws and regulations. Current
^^Ninety-Ninth Congress, 2d Sess., Conference Report No. 99-1005,
Making Continuous Appropriations for FY 1987, v. 1, October 15, 1986,
section 9111, p. 126, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1986.
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Department policy and reasoning is that existing regulations give suffi-
cient authority for competitive procurement if conditions warrant
such action. What is required are guidelines for procurement officers
to use in evaluating and reconciling: (1) long-standing congressional
policies, and (2) potential adverse local impacts if the local utility is
not the successful competitive bidder.
E. PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION FY 1988.
None of the funds appropriated or made available by this or any
other Act shall be used to procure electric utility' service in a man-
ner inconsistent with state law or policy governing the provision of
electric utility service, including electric utility franchises or service
territories established pursuant to state statute, state regulation, or
state-approved territorial agreements, or in a manner inconsistent
with provisions of the Federal Power Act of 1935, as amended. ^°
It is reasonable to infer that after careful reading of the above pro-
posed FY 1988 appropriations language— and with a thorough under-
standing of possible sources of electrical power supply— competitive
procurement of electrical power is still possible and required. The
key phrase "... inconsistent with state law or policy ..." provides the
direction and path that allows fulfillment of both CICA provisions and
provisions of the proposed FY 1988 Appropriations Act.
The Federal Power Act of 1935 (as amended) establishes federal
regulation of all interstate (and some intrastate) wholesale electric
power transactions. It also establishes national rate design standards
50100th Congress 1st Sess., Draft FY 1988 Appropriations Language
(April 21, 1987), Title VIII, General Provisions, Report of the
Committee on Appropriations, p. 277, Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 1987.
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that states must adopt unless state law or constitution prohibits such
standards. The act allows each state to regulate intrastate retail sales,
service territories, and other related matters.
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 amended the
Federal Power Act of 1935 to encourage a special class of electric
power generators. These special generators are commonly referred to
as Qualified Facility producers, or QFs. Qualified Facility producers are
either cogenerators (less than 30,000 kilowatts) or small power pro-
ducers (less than 80,000 kilowatts if generated by geotherma' &tiergy,
unlimited if generated through biomass methods). Generally, QFs are
exempted from all or most of the Federal Power Act (16 USC 791a et
seq.). State laws regarding rates of organizational regulation, and the
Public Utility Holding Company Act (14 USC 79 et seq.).^^ In addition.
Congress directed state regulatory bodies to enact rules requiring
electrical utilities to provide backup power to QFs and buy (or wheel)
energy offered by QFs in a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
manner. In establishing and encouraging QFs, Congress was undoubt-
edly aware of the unique status it was granting them. From this, it
follows that Congress was also aware that QFs would compete for cus-
tomers in some utility franchised service areas.
All parties— Congress, state regulators, and electric utility execu-
tives—recognize that military installations have the right to generate
their own power if circumstances warrant it. In an effort to allow such
5116 USC 824a.-3(e)(l), p. 853.
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actions, and to reduce federal outlays. Congress established a program
allowing private individuals to provide required production facilities.
These private projects are referred to as 3rd Party Venture Capital
Projects, or sometimes just Venture Capital (proposals, contracts,
etc.). Procurement officers are allowed to contract for venture capital
energy for periods of up to 30 years. This extreme amount of time was
necessary to ensure venture capitalists access to low-cost financial
assets, and to ensure that the federal government receives full value
and benefit of venture capital projects. In establishing such authority
and procedures. Congress was undoubtedly aware that such projects
would compete with franchised utilities for federal customers, in both
wholesale and retail markets.
Inasmuch as state laws generally allow customers the option of
self-generation and third-party generation, and/or cogeneration, it is
reasonable to infer that Department of Defense customers also have
such options. Additionally, it would be reasonable to infer that
Department installations have: (1) the ability to compete electric
power requirements when the defense installation has two or more
franchise areas adjacent to its boundaries; and/or (2)have the authority
to apply for, and use, federal power allotments administered by
Department of Energy marketing agencies. The only competition that
may be restricted for FY 1988 is that which pits the locally franchised
electric utility against an electric utility which does not have a service
area adjacent to a military installation boundary. This, too, is some-
what mitigated since the federal government would have the same
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options as other customers to petition the state regulatory commission
for authority to allow other utilities to serve its electric power
requirements. An example of this type of competition is occurring in
New York, where General Motors received approval from the New
York Public Service Commission to allow such a transaction. General
Motors is also seeking approval for a similar competition in the
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio Tri-State Area.^^
Two tjrpes of electric power contracted for by the Department of
Defense are unaffected by this appropriations act direction: whr'-: ale
power and unregulated power. An additional "type" of power that also
appears to be unaffected is new power requirements. The effect of the
appropriations act on new power requirements is uncertain because
congressional concern is focused mainly on existing electrical power
requirements and the rate shock effects of losing such requirements.
Since "new" loads are not part of the rate base, there would not be any
rate shock if these loads were competitively procured.
Further discussions on the possibilities of competitive procure-
ment of electric power in the face of this proposed legislation are
almost endless. Three important points are noted. First, the FY 1988
proposal is not yet law. Second, if the proposed language is enacted
exactly as proposed, many competitive procurement options exist. In
addition to the options outlined above, there are options available in
each of the individual states. Third, appropriations acts are valid for
52weberman, Ben, and Snitzer, Adam, "Freewheeling," Forbes, August
10, 1987, pp. 36-37.
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only one year. The Department of Defense should continue to plan and
organize strategies that will allay congressional, state regulatory, and
electric utility industry fears of severe rate shock and simultaneously
fulfill present and historical preferences for full and open competition
in procurement of electric power. While the CICA (and 10 USC 2301
et seq.) allows restrictions on bidders in the procurement process, the
intent of such restrictions was to increase competition, not restrict it.
Department of Defense efforts should be directed toward the overall
congressional mandate of increasing competition.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT
OF ELECTRICAL POWER
A. COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Competitive conditions existing at Department of Defense
installations are a mixture of variations and situations. The variations
deal with competition: There either is or is not competition. The
situations deal with jurisdiction: There is shared (or concurrent)
federal/state jurisdiction, or there is exclusive federal jurisdiction.
If there is exclusive federal jurisdiction, the ability of federal pro-
curement officers to competitively procure electric power is only
dependent upon whether competition does or does not exist [Pacific
Coast Dairy, supra, and Black Hills, supra). If there is shared federal/
state jurisdiction, the ability of federal procurement officers to com-
petitively procure electric power is dependent on two determinations.
The first determination is what the ultimate use of the electrical
power will be: appropriated fund activities, federal resale activities, or
nonappropriated fund activities. If the first determination is for either
of the first two activities, the second determination is whether com-
petition does or does not exist [Pacific Coast Dairy, supra; Black Hills,
supra: United States vs. Georgia, supra; and Public Utilities Commission of
California vs. United States, supra).
If the first determination for the ultimate purpose of the electrical
power is for a nonappropriated fund (NAF) activity, competition is still
possible but additional questions must be answered (e.g., how
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complicated will it be to compete; is it cost-effective to compete). If
the procurement official decides it is in the best interests of the
United States to compete for the electrical power needs of a NAF
activity. Black Hills, supra, and United States vs. Georgia, supra, appear
to support the federal government's right to do so. However, Penn
Dairies, supra, and Paul v. United States, supra, appear to restrict such
federal government rights. The deciding factor in such conflicts
woyld appear to be the court's view of congressional intent and
whether the Competition in Contracting Act and the Office of Federal
Procurement Act of 1974 are clear and explicit federal policies
allowing such activity. If there are not clear federal policies, competi-
tion is not possible. If there are clear federal policies (and Black Hills,
supra, buttresses such an argument), the second determination must
be whether competition does or does not exist.
If competition does not exist, the only alternative is to stay with
the existing supplier. This determination is not easy to make. To
properly document such a decision, a market survey should be made.
Properly conducted, a market survey would note:
1. The Existence of Franchised Service Areas Adjacent to or
Encompassing the Federal Installation
If there are two or more service territories adjacent to the
Department installation, competition is possible, and in fact required.
If there are one or more service territories close to the Department
installation, competition may be feasible if wheeling is economical.
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2. The Existence of Transmission Lines On (and Nearl the
Federal Activity, and the Ownerfsl of Such Lines
Transmission lines on or near Department installations may
be owned by more than one utility. "Near" is a term best defined by
the specifics of each situation. If the electrical power requirement is
large, "near" could mean any transmission line within 10 miles, or
more. If the electrical power requirement is small, one-half of a mile
may not be "near" enough. The force driving this parameter is eco-
nomics. As discussed earlier, SDG&E procured power from a genera-
tor 600 miles distant. If the economics of any situation show
competition to be in the federal government's best interest, the
Sherman Act cross-reference of 16 USC 803(h) appears to obligate
electric utilities to compete.
3. The Existence of Economic Dispatch (Pooling) Regions
and Utilities Who Are Members of Such Agreements
If the local utility is a member of an economic dispatch
agreement, there will not be any change in who generates the power-
only who is paid for it. This cardinal fact is noted by even the Edison
Electric Institute, ^^ an electrical utility lobby and association opposed
to competitive procurement of electrical power by anyone. For market
survey purposes, the federal government will not structure the details
of any possible proposal. To do so may appear to give favor or direc-
tion to one particular proposal or approach. It is sufficient to know
53public comments to the FAR Secretariat by Douglas C. Bauer, Senior
Vice-President, Edison Electric Institute, Washington, DC, September
5, 1986, p. 18.
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that competition exists and the federal government is able to take
advantage of it. If the Department installation is in an economic dis-
patch area, competition exists.
4, The Size of the Electrical Power Demanded, and the
Applicability/Adaptability of Such a Demand to PURPA QF
Suppliers
If the amount of electrical power demanded is small, compe-
tition may not be in the best interests of the federal government. In
this situation, negotiated procurement is allowed. If the amount of
electrical power demanded is very small (e.g., less than $25,000 per
year), neither competitive nor negotiated procurement is required.
This certainly makes sense if the power is for an office in an urban
setting. However, if the electrical power demand is large and/or it
can be combined with steam load requirements, the total power
requirement at that Department installation may be suitable for self-
generation, third-party venture capital projects, or QF generation. If
this is the case, competition exists and competitive procedures must
be used when it is most advantageous for the Department to do so.
5. Possibility of Wheeling Power from a Distant Electrical
Power Producer
If a non-adjacent electric utility or federal power marketing
agency has sufficient low-cost power to absorb wheeling costs, the
possibility of wheeling power and competition exists. Wheeling costs
are the key factor in this situation. Because of Otter Tail, supra, the
locally franchised utility would find it very difficult to refuse wheeling
requests. It is a commonly held, and accepted, view that the utility
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wheeling the power should be compensated for doing so. This is true
if, in fact, the wheeling utility experiences increased costs (line
losses). But, as discussed earlier, not all wheeling will result in
increased costs to the wheeling utility. If the wheeling utility's costs
are decreased by wheeling power, the other utility(ies) involved should
be compensated for such savings. ^4 Thus, since wheeling cost can be
either positive or negative, it is very difficult to analytically determine
when wheeling is a viable option. The easiest method for establishing
the applicability of this option in uncertain circumstances is to actually
compete the electrical power requirement. Such an action will
determine empirically the existing competitive environment.
The above list is not all-inclusive; it is intended to highlight
the purpose of the market survey— determination whether there is
sufficient competition in an area to warrant the use of full and open
competitive procurement procedures. If competition is not war-
ranted, negotiated procurement practices may be used.
A very important federal government option is significant to
note at this point: If competition does not exist (and circumstances
warrant such action), the contracting officer is authorized to foster
competition by limiting the number of sources from which bids and
proposals are accepted. ^^ Sometimes when the federal government
wants a second source for competition purposes (e.g., missiles, rifles),
s^Schweppe, et al, p. 1-5 and 1-6.
5510 use 2304(c)(2), p. 613.
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the only way to achieve the second source is to prohibit bids from the
dominant supplier. For utility procurement, such an action would be
very unusual. However, the contracting officer is authorized to take
such action if price discrimination is excessive, reliability of the elec-
trical power is critical, or if doing so would increase or maintain com-
petition. ^6.57 While such logic is not normally applied to electrical
pt)wer procurement, nothing in the CICA or Chapter 137
(Proctirement Generally) of Title 10 precludes such an application.
Rather, the CICA directs competition advocates to find such logic to
challenge the status quo and increase competition in procurement
practices.
B. COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
The law is hard, but it is the law. [Roman Proverb]
A federal procurement officer must consider many, sometimes
conflicting, factors when evaluating procurement options. It is neces-
sary to understand market and governmental trends, conditions, and
adaptabilities. In addition to normal commercial procurement prac-
tices, federal procurement officers must understand congressional
intent and policy. The policies and direction given by Congress do not
always affect actual practices as Congress intended them to. This is a
normal consequence of complex and overlapping policies.
5610 use 2304(c)(3), p. 613.
57public Law 98-369, section 303, 98 Stat. 1175.
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Today, federal procurement officials are facing a dilemma. His-
torical congressional policy and direction has been to encourage full
and open competitive procurement. When the FAR secretariat pub-
lished regulations directing methods of competitive procurement for
electrical power— in clear, unambiguous terms— Congress directed the
suspension of the new rules. In doing so. Congress directed the con-
tinued use of existing rules. But the existing rules (FAR subpart 8.3
and ASPR Supplement No. 5) were grandfathered in for only two years
^until 1 April 1987). If it is accepted that the FY 1987 appropriation
language extended this grandfather period, what still must be resolved
is the intent of Congress: ASPR Supplement No. 5 allows competition
of electrical power when competition is present. The ultimate ques-
tion for the Department to decide is whether to compete electrical
power or buy from the franchised utility; both options appear to still
exist.
Less stratified, but no less important, are four additional major
considerations affecting the cost and quality of electric power.
1. User Requirements and Load Characteristics
Reliability, stability, and interruptability are the most impor-
tant long-term concepts. Immediate user attention is typically
focused on substation ownership, service metering voltage, kilowatt
demand levels, energy demand levels, special service requirements
(voltage regulation, filtering, etc.), and the ability to handle projected
load growth and load surge requirements.
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2. Contract Size Thresholds
If the required electric load is specialized, small, or erratic, it
may not be economical to competitively bid. Contract bidding and
administration costs should be included in any economical analysis
used to support the determination to competitively bid an electric
power contract. Another consideration may be the ability to split a
very large electrical requirement into a series of smaller contracts.
This would allow more uniform training and staffing of procurement
offices. It also might increase competition opportunities for small and
economically disadvantaged businesses. It would allow easier justifica-
tion of excluding certain offerors if required to increase competition
and allow unsuitable and nonperforming contracts to be terminated
with less inconvenience to the federal government. This step would
also allow experimentation with the type of contract which would
assist the contracting officer in determining what the true fair and
reasonable cost of electric power is.
The negative aspect of more (and smaller) contracts is the
increased workload that is required. There is not much difference
between a utility procurement of two million dollars and one for ten
million dollars. There is, however, quite a difference between one
two-million-dollar contract and five two-million-dollar contracts.
Another parameter to be considered is how to differentiate the per-
formance of multiple commodity suppliers. All are delivering a homo-
geneous commodity that is used immediately. An additional contract
to monitor performance or contract-specific language requiring
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coordination and cooperation are possibilities. Fortunately, such
agreements/arrangements already exist between electric utility com-
panies. The technical ability to monitor individual contract perfor-
mance is only one of many important contract details. It is mentioned
here to remind everyone concerned that there are downside risks and
difficulties to be considered.
3. Contract Time Periods
The length of any contract must be carefully considered.
Existing statues pUow contracts for energy services to last for periods
of up to 30 years (with prior Secretary of Defense approval). s® Gener-
ally (e.g., US Navy), contracts for periods of greater than ten years
require prior approval of the Service Secretary. If the primary intent
of the contract is to assist QFs, or third-party venture capital contrac-
tors, a long contract time period may be correct. If the primary intent
of the contract is to take advantage of the flexibility and cost advan-
tages afforded by competitive contracts, shorter time periods with
contract options may be more appropriate. Many alternatives are
available. The one chosen must make sense for the specific situation
and effects desired. Long and short time periods have specific advan-
tages and disadvantages unique to the time period selected. Irrespec-
tive of the exact time period, due consideration must be given to
expected mission characteristics, economic trends, electrical reliabil-
ity, electrical supply security, and reprocurement of electrical
5810 use 2394, United States Code. v. 3, p. 388, Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 1983.
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requirements at the end of the proposed contract period. A mixture
of demand and indefinite term contracts would offer installation pro-
curement officials the greatest level of flexibility. The exact type and
number of contracts depend upon the considerations listed above, and
considerations that are contract specific.
4. Contract Methodologies
Competitive bidding of electric power is not the procurement
norm. Because of the criticality of this commodity, evaluation of bid
proposals is judicious. The many factors of electrical service lend
themselves to detailed design specifications. However, a mixture of
design and performance specifications is more appropriate. User
requirements such as voltage stability can be provided in more than
one manner. Dictating specific methods to achieve contract require-
ments unnecessarily restricts proposals. Such restrictions offer
avenues for rejected bidders to protest awards. Restrictions in pro-
curement contracts should receive careful consideration before inclu-
sion. Inasmuch as evaluation of all proposals is (probably) necessary,
multi-step and competitively negotiated, performance-oriented
design contracts are preferred.
C. PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES
Long-term availability of electric power and the regulatory bargain
are two considerations often brought forth to discourage the competi-
tion of power requirements. While more assertion than argument,
these considerations deserve attention. A strategy that confronts both
issues is to reserve (for the local utility) a portion of the total required
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demand. This fenced demand could be the minimum uninterruptable
installation requirements or the remainder of the total installation
requirement. It could be off-peak power or any other identifiable
power requirement.
The purpose of such a strategy might be to stay with the local
utility for strategic and comity reasons. It might cushion the local
utility and utility ratepayers from the effect of an immediately com-
petitive environment. This might result in higher short-term electri-
cal power costs *"rr the Department of Defense. Properly handled,
such a policy might also increase the total number of electric power
suppliers. This situation could develop naturally, or it could be
assisted by judiciously restricting certain offerors from individual con-
tract competitions. It is not necessary that this occur; it is very
important that it can occur.
The ability to verify cost fairness and reasonableness could be a
side benefit of slowly easing into a major or fully competitive procure-
ment environment. A 1986 cost-of-service survey by the Electricity
Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) assessed cross-class subsidies
paid by industrial customers. On average, industrial rates were six
percent higher than strict measure of cost allocation indicated they
should be. The numbers used in the study were from 1984, the latest
year with full utility sales and revenue results.^9
59Cost-of-Service Survey, Profiles in Electricity Issues No. 1 (March
1986), p. 5, Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Washington, DC.
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In FY 1986, the Department of Defense paid over $1,644 billion
for commercial electric power. Applying the six-percent ELCON
amount as an average suggests that the Department paid over $98.6
million in cross-class subsidies during FY 1986. Considering the high
cost areas of many Department military installations, this figure can be
considered quite conservative. In California, the ELCON report noted
the average rate-of-return difference between residential and indus-
trial customers was 11.6 percent: The difference between the average
industrial and average system rate of return was 7 percent.^o Compe-
tition-influenced negotiations between San Diego Gas and Electric
Company and the US Navy currently underway appear to be producing
estimated savings of $11 million per year, or approximately 13 per-
cent of the US Navy's yearly bill.
Multiple contracts for definite and indefinite tenns could induce
utilities in every area to compete with greater enthusiasm. The effect
of losing part of a governmental load would not be as severe as losing
the entire governmental load. As each contract bid period was clos-
ing, the competing utilities could examine their individual situations
and adjust their bids appropriately. A utility that lost a "local" load
one week could be partially, or completely, compensated if it won a
"distant" load the next week. Such competition would also allow
small businesses to compete for part of the federal electrical power
requirements on more equal footing with large utilities. This would
^(^Ibid., p. A-1.
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have the added benefit of encouraging third-party venture capitalists
and PURPA-allowed QFs. These are two high-interest congressional
initiatives. If these events were to occur, they would have the effect of
increasing local, and system, electric power reliability. Reliability
would increase because of reduced dependency on the high-voltage
transmission grid and on very large single-site generators (e.g.. Three
Mile Island, PA; Seabrook, NH; Shoreham, NY). For some areas, small
power producers might also provide added margins of safety if large
power plants require restart (e.g., r»1nnts taken off-line by earthquake,
transmission grid failures, or switching station failures).
One strategy already being used, but as of yet not fully exploited, is
cogeneration. This option allows use of secondary steam cycles for
heating needs, industrial purposes, peaking loads, and load shifting. If
the cogeneration site is within the military installation boundaries and
security zones, the added benefit of increased energy security is
achievable. These benefits have been recognized and programs to
achieve them have been authorized and utilized. They are mentioned
here to remind procurement strategists that competitive procurement
strategies can, should, and must be integrated into existing programs.
One final strategy consideration is electric utility industry pres-
sure for deregulation and competitive electric sales. In the past sev-
eral years, electric industry strategists have foreseen the opportunities
afforded by deregulation of generation and transmission activities.
Public Service Company of New Mexico has applied to its regulatory
commission for permission to restructure itself. The utility wants to
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separate its generation, transmission, and distribution activities into
separate businesses. Duke Power Company in Charlotte, NC, recently
proposed to buy and operate a nuclear generating plant in California.
Chicago's Commonwealth Edison Electric Company has applied to the
Illinois jRegulatory Commission for permission to spin off a portion of
its nuclear generating capability, ^i These, and other, electric utility
companies recognize that the past regulatory environment supporting
total monopolies is gone. It is a casualty of technology advances in
generation and transmissir^i fields. It is also a victim of its own abuses:
Regulatory procedures, delays, and obstruction of industry innovations,
methods, and rate relief have increased the costs electric utilities
absorb and rate-payers bear.
In 1978 (via PURPA), Congress injected seeds of change into all
utility industries. The electric utility industry is experimenting with
open-market techniques in generation and transmission. A consensus
is forming that generation is no longer a true monopolistic activity and
should be deregulated completely. A similar consensus is evolving to
turn the power transmission grid into the status of a "common
carrier." This is what happened to the natural gas and oil industry.
While mciny regulators and electric utilities will oppose these moves, it
appears that economic and deregulatory forces will eventually force
such moves. The last regulated electric utility activity— distribution-
appears to be a true natural monopoly. No consensus or acceptable
siWeberman, p. 36.
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argument has been found that would support the deregulation of this
activity. Most Department of Defense installations operate their own
distribution grids independent of the local electric utility. The
regulation of, or lack thereof, of distribution grids has little to no
effect on the Department of Defense.
D. ELECTRICAL UTILITY INDUSTRY OBJECTIONS
A complete listing of all the objections the electric utility industry
has to competitive procurement of electric power is not intended in
this study. Comments on proposed changes to the FAR, published in
the Federal Register, ran several feet in depth. The comments below
are the major ones distilled from 77 pages of comments by the Edison
Electric Institute, as submitted to the FAR Secretariat on 5 September
1986. The Edison Electric Institute is an association of private
investor-owned electric utilities. It acts as a lobbyist presenting the
majority position of its member utilities.
1. The Institute Believes that the Proposal to Compete
Power Requirements is Inconsistent with Existing Federal
and State Laws and Jurisdictions .
Their position is that there is nothing mandated in the CICA
that requires electrical power to be competitively procured. Neither
is there ainything in the CICA or the OFPPA that directs actions over-
turning the existing federal/ state regulatory framework based on the
1935 Federal Power Act.
This is the strongest of the institute's positions and argu-
ments. Unfortunately, it is an argument without thrust. As outlined in
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Chapter II, congressional policy, federal law, and US Supreme Court
decisions all support the opposite view. The point is not that the laws
require competitive procurement of electrical power: They do not
allow for the noncompetitive procurement of electrical power unless
certain conditions exist. When and where such conditions do not
exist, electrical power must be competitively bid. Congressional
direction goes farther still— procurement officers must challenge
existing situations when competitive procurement of goods and ser-
vices is not possible. This is the mandate that congressional policy
codified into Public Law 98-369, the Competition in Contracting Act
of 1984,62 Title 41, USC 418b,63 and Title 10. USC 2318.64 Thus,
calling a cow's tail a leg does not make it one, cadit quaestio.
2. The Institute Believes That, if Power Requirements are
Competitively Procured and Federal Customers Leave the
Local System, the Remaining Rateoavers Will See
Increased Rates .
This will be true if the utility loses competitive procurement
contracts of previously negotiated electrical power requirements.
This will also be true if the federal customer were to turn to self-gen-
eration or cogenerated power. Additionally, this will be true if the
federal installation accepts a third-party venture capital contractor's
62public Law 98-369. section 20(b), 98 Stat. 1198.
6341 U.S.C. 418b, United States Code, Supplement III, v. 3, p. 539,
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1986.
6410 USC 2318, Supplement III, pp. 623, 624.
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proposal or PURPA QF contractor's proposal for power. To argue that
competitive procurement of electric power may raise remaining
ratepayer rates is acceptable. To ignore the fact that the same effect
can be brought about by other legal and valid methods is pure sophism.
Ignored in the institute's position are those utilities that win
competitive procurements. If the power requirements are new to that
utility, its ratepayers should experience an immediate benefit in the
form of lower rates. This will occur for exactly the same reasons the
losing utility's ratepayers will experience a rate increase However, as
competition forces increased efficiency, the losing utility's ratepayers
will also experience some benefits from the competition. In the long
run, all parties will benefit from the increased efficiency and eco-
nomics of the situation. An additional point not mentioned in the
institute's position is that increased rates will result when large pri-
vate customers choose to leave the rate base. The institute is trying to
deny the federal government rights private companies and individuals
already enjoy.
3. The Institute Believes the Overall Reliability of Electric
Service Will be Degraded .
This will occur because competitive procurement of electric
power will exacerbate the difficult task of forecasting future electrical
demand. Reliability of service will also suffer if "distant" power is
wheeled by the power transmission grid.
Both of these arguments have a shard of truth. The transmis-
sion grid argument is the strongest. Bid proposals should be rejected
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if power flow analysis shows the planned procurement reduces overall
system reliability. This is one reason power flow analysis data must be
made available to all interested parties. However, not all bid proposals
will destabilize the transmission system. As discussed in Chapter II,
some wheeling proposals have the capacity to strengthen system sta-
bility. Neglecting this possibility is not logical if system reliability
improvement is a goal.
The forecasting argument is without real merit. Adding one
more factor to the hundreds utility forecasters already contend with is
not onerous. Any attempt to forecast trends five to fifteen years into
the future is replete with uncertainties. The current supply surplus is
evidence that past attempts to forecast today's demands were unsuc-
cessful. Difficulties in forecasting future trends will not go away if
competitive procurement policies are spiked. However, such difficul-
ties may be mitigated if there are multiple small to medium suppliers
of electricity available to provide a cushion if demand is underesti-
mated. Thus, again, cadit quaestio.
4. The Institute Believes that the Obligation-to-Serve Prin-
ciple of the Regulatory Bargain is Being Abused bv the
Federal Government's Proposal to Compete Power
Requirements .
This argument notes that existing facilities were built to serve
existing loads in defined service territories. It further postulates
there might be legal, technical, and operational repercussions if
wheeling (retail) power were allowed. To overcome such
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repercussions, it may be necessary to build additional— perhaps
duplicate— transmission capacity.
The argument against new transmission capacity is absurd. If
the power to be wheeled is inexpensive enough to absorb such costs,
the local utility may have been very poorly managed. Holding any cus-
tomer captive to inefficient producers because their management has
been ineffective is ludicrous. Holding the federal government captive
to such management would appear (to most sensible individuals as)
irresponsible. If new transmission capacity is built, it is rtioit likely to
improve transmission grid and system stability. The institute's argu-
ment of system reliability (weak reliability) and operational considera-
tions (duplicate facilities) are at cross-purposes in some respects.
They are more arguments based on hardship to the electric utility
industry than arguments based on relevant facts.
This still leaves the considerations of possible repercussions
and the obligation-to-serve principle. Repercussions for a changed
state of affairs seem baseless. The US Supreme Court has held indi-
vidual contractors blameless for using their property to contract with
the federal government [Pacific Coast Dainj Inc. v. Department of Agri-
culture of California, 318 US 285 (1943), et al).^^ For states to hold
the federal government responsible for exercising its right to conduct
business without state interference is in violation of the supremacy
clause of the US Constitution.
^^Pacific Coast Dairy Inc., p. 628.
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To argue that existing facilities were built for existing loads is
to argue for unchanging conditions— it isn't possible. If the federal
government requires something site specific (e.g., a second transmis-
sion feeder), then it should be held responsible for the specific need
costs. The argument that an industrial customer must stay with a util-
ity because the utility has made long-term decisions for investment is
improper. This is merely an argument for monopoly profits. Most
commercial customers have the long-term option of leaving a geo-
graphic service area; as a rule. Department of Defense installattoi.s do
not. Restricting Department options to seek less-expensive goods and
services is in direct conflict with 178 years of congressional direction.
This direction dates from the 10th Congress, March 3, 1809:
... All purchases and contracts for supplies and services which are or
may, according to law, be made by or under the direction of either
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of
the Navy, shall be made ... by previously advertising for proposals....^^
Additional points disputing this argument are possible but hardly nec-
essary. The federal government is allowed to use its position and size
to procure goods and services at prices most advantageous to itself. It
need not apologize for this ability. If the impact of leaving a local ser-
vice area is economically catastrophic in the short term, special con-
tracting arrangements can be made. Curtailing a significant federal
right is a very harsh long-term response for possible (not probable or
certain) local economic harm.
^^United States Statutes At Large, v. 2, chapter 27, section 5, p. 536,
Charles C. Little and James Brown, Boston, MA, 1845.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
Competition in the Department of Defense has undergone a philo-
sophical metamorphosis. The catalytic agent of this change was
Congress, The Office of Federal Policy Procurement Act and the Com-
petition in Contracting Act are the mechanisms that ensure continued
nurturing of this new philosophic outlook.
While the Department of Defense was experiencing a competition
catharsis, the Electric Utility Industry was experiencing a similar reg-
ulatory metathesis. The catalyst of this transformation was the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act. While not directly applicable to
Department of Defense procurement policy, this act provided the
mechanisms for competition in the electric utility industry (economic
dispatch and QFs). Technology has provided the means, and Congress
has provided the authority, for interested parties to engage in
competition with established utilities. While not intuitively evident,
the competition catharsis of the electric utility industry is well
underway.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This study has revealed a numiber of conclusions relevant to com-
petitive electrical power procurement.
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1. The Department of Defense Policy of Comity Regarding
Utility Purchases is in Conflict With Existing Statutes
and Regulations .
The Competition in Contracting Act, at al., and relevant
United States Code clearly require competition of electric power pro-
curement. Congress has historically required competition whenever
possible.
2. The Department of Defense Has the Authority to Com-
petitiyely Procure Electric Power .
Congress has directed a policy of competitive procurement.
The US Supreme Court has found that this policy is legal. Further, the
Supreme Court has held (due to the constitutional supremacy clause)
individual states cannot interfere with or hinder this policy. If the
electric power is to be used for official purposes, the Department of
Defense's authority to competitively procure such power is effectively
absolute.
3. Many Conditions Exist Which Support Competitive Pro-
curement of Electric Power Requirements .
In addition to the often-cited conditions of no franchise area
or more than one supplier in a franchise area are: (1) existence of
qualifying facility power producers; (2) self-generation or cogenera-
tion; (3) third-party venture capital: (4) discriminatory rates: (5)
supply reliability: etc. Congress has also enacted statutes that allow
procurement officers to restrict potential bidders to enhance and fos-
ter the federal government's ability to competitively procure goods
and services.
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4. The US Supreme Court Ruling That Utilities Are Subject
to Antitrust Laws Profoundly Enhances Competition
AbiUties .
The Department of Defense does not usually have grounds to
request Federal Energy Regulatory Commission wheeling orders under
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act. Otter Tail, supra, gives the
Department the ahility to request wheeling orders in federal court,
under federal law, if local utilities refuse to honor potential bidders'
requests to wheel power. Further, this ruling prohibits electric utili-
ties from making agreements, or reaching understaiidings, not to
compete if they have the ability to compete.
5. Competitive Electric Power Procurement Will Result in
Fair and Reasonable Rates For All Ratepayers .
Current rate and tariff schedules are biased against non-resi-
dential customers. Electric utility industry and state regulatory oppo-
sition to competitive procurement proposals are an attempt to con-
tinue cross-class subsidization of residential customers. Such rate
inequities are hidden federal subsidies the Department of Defense
pays to state and local governments and ratepayers. Electric utility
industry statements that local rates will increase if large customers
compete electrical power purchases are assertions and arguments for
unevenly assessed monopoly profits. Further, such arguments are
appeals based on inconvenience and passion rather than relevant fed-
eral rights, procurement law, or obligations to all United States citi-
zens— not just those living around military installations.
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6. Current fFY 19871 and Proposed fFY 19881 Defense
Appropriation Acts Do Not Totally Restrict Competitive
Electric Power Requirements .
The language of the FY 1987 act prohibits rigid codification
(in the FAR) of the Competition in Contracting Act. The FY 1987 lan-
guage still allows electric power to be competitively procured if the
procurement officer is aware that competition is possible. Further,
and quite significantly, the direction contained in the language does
not relieve the Department of Defense from adherence to the Compe-
tition in Contracting Act (and relevant federal statues). Ixie proposed
language of the FY 1988 act, while slightly more sweeping, does not
explicitly give up the right of supremacy or competitive procurement
of electrical power. Neither act gives states unambiguous authority to
regulate power sales to Department installations on land under exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction. Because of the national procurement and
energy impact of this type of restriction, the matter is likely to be
debated before the full Congress. National procurement and energy
policy is unlikely to be left to only the Defense Appropriations Com-
mittees of the House and Senate.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Department of Defense Should Develop and Issue
Policy Directing Competitive Procurement of Electric
Power in Accordance With Existing Laws and Regulations:
The Policy of Comity Should Be Dropped .
This policy should address contract strategies, timing, size,
etc. It should also address the subject of local impacts and the
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importance of mitigating those impacts when possible (e.g., multiple
contract awards). The policy should avoid giving rigid instructions on
procurement methods.
2. The Department of Defense Should Initiate an Integrated
Electric Power Strate^ Group .
Guidance on strategy should direct evaluation of all major and
relevant factors (e.g., supply reliability, supply security, applications).
The group would be responsible for dealing with proposed congres-
sional legislation, regulatory concerns, and electric utility industry
relations. The group would also be responsible for correlation and
evaluation of data produced by the Department of Energy and the
Electric Utility Industry (often in response to federal law). Currently,
individual services have utility rate intervention teams that might be
considered for such a role. However, the staffing of each team would
have to be increased substantially to adequately deal with all relevant
issues. An organization at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
level would be more appropriate for tasks as outlined above.
3. Areas of Leadership and Responsibility Should Be
Assigned to Each of the Services .
Each military installation in an area would be supported by
the service responsible for utility contracts in that area. Each service
would also be responsible for developing an area of expertise relevant
to the electrical utility field. Questions, conflicts, etc. would be
referred to the service responsible for leadership in that area. Estab-
lishing areas and leadership roles will allow the Department of
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Defense to exercise advanced procurement and training strategies
while providing required field logistical support.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Principle Research Question: What Do Current Federal
Statues. Regulations, and Policies Mandate for Competi-
tive Procurement of Electrical Power?
There is not a clear federal policy on the interpretation of
what existing statutes and regulations mean. Federal statutes direct
competition for goods and services to the fullest extent posp'ble. Con-
gressional policy since at least 1809 (the Tenth Congress) has been to
require today's equivalent of full and open competition for goods and
services. US Supreme Court rulings uphold the right, and obligation,
of federal procurement officers to compete the acquisition of goods
and services, almost without interference of state regulations. How-
ever, House and Senate Appropriations Committees have placed
direction in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act prohibiting
the Department from issuing (in the FAR) clear, unambiguous language
implementing competition guidelines (for electrical power) required
by relevant federal statutes. While this act must be renewed each new
fiscal year, it still has the force of law for that fiscal year. Irrespective
of the Appropriations Act directions, the CICA requires competition
for goods and services procurement. Until clear, unambiguous direc-
tion is received from Congress, procurement officers must compete
electrical power needs within the parameters set down by Congress.
To date. Congress has not prohibited competitive procurement of
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electrical power, only certain tj^Des of competitions {utility vs. utility)
when certain conditions exist.
2. Secondary Research Question: What Are the Conditions
Necessary For the Department of Defense to Competi-
tively Procure Electric Power in the Most Timely and
Efficient Manner?
A clear and flexible performance-oriented design specifica-
tion is important. The unambiguous authority to contract for competi-
tive electrical power is also crucial. This can be shown to exist in a
number of ways: the existence of more than one supplier willing to
make an offer to supply the proposed contract electrical power
requirements, the ability to supply the required electrical power from
self-generation or cogeneration, or the ability to gain the most advan-
tageous position for the government (achieved by strategy and tactics).
But the cornerstone of any successful procurement process is an ade-
quate procurement staff trained in the details of the procurement at
hand. In this procurement situation, such a staff should include
experts in the fields of electric utilities, regulatory agencies, and fed-
eral procurement contracting.
E. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH
1
.
Amount of cross-class subsidy paid annually by the Department of
Defense. This will establish what the cost of current policies and
practices is. It will also highlight those installations uath the
greatest amounts of subsidy, both cash and percentage of bill.
2. Annual rate of return reported by electric utilities serving
Department of Defense installations. This will allow the Depart-
ment to concentrate on those rates and tariffs that clearly are too
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high. Installations in such utility service areas are paying not only
cross-class subsidies but also unfair monopoly profits.
3. Difference between tariff rates charged Department of Defense
installations and tariff rates charged wholesale customers of elec-
tric utilities serving those installations. This will allow the
Department to gauge the fairness and reasonableness of current
tariff rates. If inappropriate, the Department could concentrate
on negotiations and/or competition to obtain relief.
4. The practices currently being used by private companies to
reduce energy costs. Special emphasis could be given to prac-
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